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A TRIBUTE TO FRANKLIND. CLECKLEY
V. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Summary Judgment
The case of Painter v. Peay178 articulated the role of the circuit court in
assessing evidence at the summary judgment stage. Justice Cleckley wrote that
"[t]he circuit court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there is
a genuine issue for trial." '179 It was also stressed in Painter that
[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that
it has the burden to prove.'
Justice Cleckley elaborated upon summary judgment in Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc. 8 by incorporating the "totality" doctrine into the formula:
Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the
evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of the case that it has the burden to prove.8 2
Williams went on to articulate the shifting burden that takes place in
summary judgment:
If the moving party makes a properly supported motion for
summary judgment and can show by affirmative evidence that
there is no genuine issue of a material fact, the burden of
production shifts to the nonmoving party who must either (1)
178 451 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1994).
179 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
180 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
181 459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995).
182 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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rehabilitate the evidence attacked by the moving party, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for
trial, or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is
necessary as provided in Rule 56(f) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure."'
In Gentry v. Mangum,' Justice Cleckley made further comments on
summary judgment:
Summaryjudgment is proper only if, in the context of the motion
and any opposition to it, no genuine issue of material fact exists
and the movant demonstrates entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law. A party seeking summary judgment must make a
preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmovant must
contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating
that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue. An expert's deposition or
affidavit that is conclusory only is not sufficient to meet the burden
on the party opposing the motion, although an affidavit or
deposition containing an adequately supported opinion may suffice
to raise a genuine issue of fact. An issue is "genuine" when the
evidence relevant to it, viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion, is sufficiently open ended to permit a
rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either side.8
In Powderidge Unit Owners Association v. Highland Properties, Ltd.,"8 6
Justice Cleckley carved out an informal procedure for a party to resist a summary
judgment motion, if discovery was not completed:
An opponent of a summary judgment motion requesting a
continuance for further discovery need not follow the exact letter
of Rule 56(f) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in
order to obtain it. When a departure from the rule occurs, it should
183 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
184 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
185 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
186 474 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1996).
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be made in written form and in a timely manner. The statement
must be made, if not by affidavit in some authoritative manner by
the party under penalty of perjury or by written representations of
counsel. At a minimum, the party making an informal Rule 56(f)
motion must satisfy four requirements. It should (1) articulate
some plausible basis for the party's belief that specified
"discoverable" material facts likely exist which have not yet
become accessible to the party; (2) demonstrate some realistic
prospect that the material facts can be obtained within a reasonable
additional time period; (3) demonstrate that the material facts will,
if obtained, suffice to engender an issue both genuine and material;
and (4) demonstrate good cause for failure to have conducted the
discovery earlier." 7
B. Venue
The case of State ex rel. Smith v. Maynard..8 afforded the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals an opportunity to interpret the venue transfer provision
in West Virginia Code section 56-1-1(b) and its relation to the doctrine offorum
non conveniens. Justice Cleckley made clear that "[u]nder W. Va. Code, 56-1-1(b)
(1986), the plaintiff s choice of forum is no longer the dominant factor that it was
prior to the adoption of this section."'8 9 It was also held that "[b]y enacting W. Va.
Code, 56-1-1(b) (1986), the legislature granted to the circuit courts of this State
broader discretion than was permissible under the old rule of forum non
conveniens."'90  The opinion further concluded that "[w]here W. Va. Code,
56-1-1(b) (1986), applies, its explicit provisions render inapplicable the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. As a consequence, to the extent that the West Virginia
doctrine of forum non conveniens has survived this new statutory enactment it
applies only where W. Va. Code, 56-1-1(b) (1986), does not apply.''
The decision in Maynard set out the broad outline of section 56-1-1(b) as
follows:
187 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
188 454 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1994).
189 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
190 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
191 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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If suit is brought in the county where the cause of action arose and
if none of.the defendants reside in that county, W. Va. Code,
56-1-1(b) (1986), permits a defendant to move the circuit court to
transfer the case to a county wherein one or more of the defendants
reside. For the circuit court to grant the motion, a defendant must
demonstrate that the proposed county would better afford
convenience to the parties litigant and the witnesses likely to be
called, and that the ends of justice would be better served by such
change.' 92
Justice Cleckley found that "W. Va. Code, 56-1-1(b) (1986), exclusively
controls a transfer decision where its prerequisites have been met; namely, the
forum selected is where the cause of action arose, and the defendant resides in
another county and requests the case be transferred to that county.' 93
*An issue left unresolved in Maynard was decided in State ex rel. Riffle v.
Ranson."9 Riffle held that "W. Va. Code, 56-1-1(b) (1986), is the exclusive
authority for a discretionary transfer or change of venue and any other transfer or
change of venue from one county to another within West Virginia that is not
explicitly permitted by the statute is impermissible and forbidden.""9 '
The issue offorum non conveniens presented itself in Cannelton Industries,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of America.196 The central issue in that case
was the interpretation to be given to a "service of suit" clause and the ability of a
party to assertforum non conveniens, notwithstanding the service of suit clause.
Justice Cleckley held that
[t]he phrase in a service of suit clause stating the insurer "will
submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction
within the United States of America" does not restrict the insurer
from bringing an action in another forum and from subsequently
filing aforum non conveniens motion in a forum selected by the
insured. Moreover, the phrase "and all matters arising hereunder
shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of
192 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
193 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
194 464 S.E.2d 763 (W. Va. 1995).
195 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
196 460 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1994).
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such Court" includes a determination in accordance with the
doctrine offorum non conveniens if the doctrine is available to the
court.1 97
C. Jury Selection
The case of Michael ex rel. Estate of Michael v. Sabado198 necessitated two
definitive principles involving jury voir dire. Justice Cleckley held that "[t]he
official purposes of voir dire is to elicit information which will establish a basis for
challenges for cause and to acquire information that will afford the parties an
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. The means and methods that the trial
judge uses to accomplish these purposes are within his discretion." '199 The opinion
however cautioned that
[a] trial court may not limit voir dire to the extent that the very
purpose of voir dire has been substantially undermined or
frustrated. Thus, a trial court may abuse its discretion if it so limits
the voir dire that the litigants are unable to determine whether the
jurors are statutorily qualified or free from bias."2 "0
D. Jury Instructions
The issue of punitive damage instructions to a jury were addressed in
Michael ex rel. Estate of Michael v. Sabado."' The opinion held that "[p]unitive
damage instructions are legitimate only where there is evidence that a defendant
acted with wanton, willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to civil
obligations affecting the rights of others to appear or where the legislature so
authorizes. 202
197 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
199 453 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1994).
199 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
200 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
201 453 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1994).
202 Id. at 423 Syl. Pt. 7.
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In Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 03 Justice Cleckley restricted the
holding in a previous decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
which had held that it was per se reversible error for a court to fail to give requested
special verdict forms whenever there were multiple causes of action against a
defendant. Barefoot refused to extend the latter rule to asserted multiple theories
of liability against a defendant. The decision in Barefoot noted initially that "[a]s
a general rule, a trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether to
give special verdicts and interrogatories to a jury unless it is mandated to do so by
statute."2 °4 The opinion then held, "[t]o the extent that aper se reversible error rule
was announced in Orr v. Crowder it should be limited to the specific facts stated
and a further expansion of this rule is unwarranted."2 5 Justice Cleckley went on to
fashion a rule regarding multiple theories of liability:
Although it would be preferable to give special verdict forms in
multiple theory employment discrimination cases, which would
remove doubt as to the jury's consideration of any alternative basis
of liability that does not have adequate evidentiary support, the
refusal to do so does not provide an independent basis for reversing
an otherwise valid judgment." 6
E. Motion for Reconsideration
James MB. v. Carolyn M.2 7 held that in making a motion for
reconsideration, "Rule 59(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides
the procedure for a party who seeks to change or revise a judgment entered as a
result of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.'"0 8 The opinion
also noted that
[a] motion for reconsideration filed within ten days of judgment
being entered suspends the finality of the judgment and makes the
203 457 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1995).
204 Id. at 157 Syl. Pt. 8.
205 Id. at 157 Syl. Pt. 10.
206 Id. at 157 Syl. Pt. 11.
207 456 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1995).
208 Id. at 18 Syl. Pt. 4.
[Vol. 100:
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judgment unripe for appeal. When the time for appeal is so
extended, its full length begins to run from the date of entry of the
order disposing of the motion." 9
Justice Cleckley confronted the issue of a motion for reconsideration in
Powderidge Unit Owners Association v. Highland Properties, Ltd.
210
When a party filing a motion for reconsideration does not indicate
under which West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure it is filing the
motion, the motion will be considered to be either a Rule 59(e)
motion to alter or amend a judgment or a Rule 60(b) motion for
relief from a judgment order. If the motion is filed within ten days
of the circuit court's entry ofjudgment, the motion is treated as a
motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). If the motion is filed
outside the ten-day limit it can only be addressed under Rule
60(b).2n
F. Attorney Fees
Justice Cleckley found the opportunity in State ex rel. West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection212 to address the issue of awarding attorney fees in the context of a
mandamus proceeding. The opinion held initially that "[c]osts and attorney's fees
may be awarded in mandamus proceedings involving public officials because
citizens should not have to resort to lawsuits to force government officials to
perform their legally prescribed nondiscretionary duties."2 3 Justice Cleckley then
limited the context for awarding attorney's fees in mandamus actions. The opinion
held,
[a]ttorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing petitioner in a
mandamus action in two general contexts: (1) where a public
official has deliberately and knowingly refused to exercise a clear
209 Id. at 18 Syl. Pt. 7.
210 474 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1996).
211 Id. at 875-876 Syl. Pt. 2.
212 458 S.E.2d 88 (W. Va. 1995).
213 Id. at 89 Syl. Pt. 1.
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legal duty, and (2) where a public official has failed to exercise a
clear legal duty, although the failure was not the result of a
decision to knowingly disregard a legal command." 4
The opinion clarified that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate where
there is a showing of deliberate and knowing refusal by a public official to perform
a duty: "[w]here a public official has deliberately and knowingly refused to exercise
a clear legal duty, a presumption exists in favor of an award of attorney's fees;
unless extraordinary circumstances indicate an award would be inappropriate,
attorney's fees will be allowed."2 5 A different standard was set out for awarding
attorney's fees where a public official did not knowingly fail to perform a legal
duty. In the latter context Justice Cleckley held,
[w]here a public official has failed to exercise a clear legal duty,
although the failure was not the result of a decision to knowingly
disregard a legal command, there is no presumption in favor of an
award of attorney's fees. Rather, the court will weigh the
following factors to determine whether it would be fairer to leave
the costs of litigation with the private litigant or impose them on
the taxpayers: (a) the relative clarity by which the legal duty was
established; (b) whether the ruling promoted the general public
interest or merely protected the private interest of the petitioner or
a small group of individuals; and (c) whether the petitioner has
adequate financial resources such that petitioner can afford to
protect his or her own interests in court and as between the
government and petitioner.2 6
The final issue touched upon in West Virginia Highlands Conservancy
concerned apportionment of attorney's fees:
Apportionment of attorney's fees is appropriate where some of the
claims and efforts of the claimant were unsuccessful. Where part
of the attorney's fees sought was expended on discrete efforts that
achieved no appreciable advantage in the litigation, or where the
claim for attorney's fees rests partly on a result to which the
214 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
215 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
216 Id. at Syl. PL 4.
[Vol. 100:
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claimant made no significant contribution, a court may consider
these circumstances and apportion the attorney's fees
accordingly.217
The issue of attorney fees in divorce actions was addressed in Banker v.
Banker:218
In divorce actions, an award of attorney's fees rests initially within
the sound discretion of the family law master and should not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In determining
whether to award attorney's fees, the family law master should
consider a wide array of factors including the party's ability to pay
his or her own fee, the beneficial results obtained by the attorney,
the parties' respective financial conditions, the effect of the
attorney's fees on each party's standard of living, the degree of
fault of either party making the divorce action necessary, and the
reasonableness of the attorney's fee request.2
Justice Cleckley made clear in State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone20 that
attorney fees could be awarded as a sanction in paternity actions. It was determined
in the opinion that "[b]ecause a paternity action is in the nature of an equitable
proceeding, and pursuant to Rule 1 1 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
a circuit court has discretion to impose attorney's fees on litigants who bring
vexatious and groundless lawsuits."'"
The decision in Kopelman and Associates, L. C. v. Collins222 required
guidelines be set out for circuit courts in determining how to divide fees, when an
attorney leaves a firm with a client of the firm and there is a recovery:
Although the amount of time spent by each respective firm is an
important consideration in a contingency fee case where lawyers
217 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
218 474 S.E.2d 465 (W.Va. 1996).
219 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
220 474 S.E.2d 554 (W.Va. 1996).
221 Ma at Syl. Pt. 4.
222 473 S.E.2d 910 (W.Va. 1996).
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employed by one firm leave that firm and take a client with them
and no contract exists governing how the fees are to be divided, a
circuit court also must consider retrospectively upon the
conclusion of the case: (1) the relative risks assumed by each firm;
(2) the frequency and complexity of any difficulties encountered
by each firm; (3) the proportion of funds invested and other
contributions made by each firm; (4) the quality of representation;
(5) the degree of skill needed to achieve success; (6) the result of
each firm's efforts; (7) the reason the client changed firms; (8) the
viability of the claim at transfer; and (9) the amount of recovery
realized. This list is not exhaustive, and a circuit court may
consider other factors as warranted by the circumstances in
addition to awarding out-of-pocket expenses. In making its
determination, however, a circuit court must make clear on the
record its reasons for awarding a certain amount. Such a
determination rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court, and
it will not be disturbed unless the circuit court abused its
discretion.'
G. Motion in Limine
The case of Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc.24 required the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to consider what limitations were imposed
upon a trial court in deciding whether to modify a prior motion in limine order:
Once a trial judge rules on a motion in limine, that ruling becomes
the law of the case unless modified by a subsequent ruling of the
court. A trial court is vested with the exclusive authority to
determine when and to what extent an in limine order is to be
modified.'
2n3 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
2M4 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).
W25 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
[Vol. 100:
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H. Judgment on the Pleadings
In Kopelman andAssociates, L. C. v. Collins, 6 Justice Cleckley focused on
establishing guidelines when a motion for judgment on the pleadings is converted
to a summary judgment motion:
When a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is converted into a
motion for summary judgment, the requirements of Rule 56 of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure become operable. Under
these circumstances, a circuit court is required to give the parties
notice of the changed status of the motion and a reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56. In this way, no litigant will be taken by surprise by the
conversion. The absence of formal notice will be excused only
when it is harmless or the parties were otherwise apprised of the
conversion. Once the proceeding becomes one for summary
judgment, the moving party's burden changes and the moving party
is obliged to demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.22 7
L Motion to Dismiss
In Harrison v. Davis,228 Justice Cleckley reinforced the liberal policy
behind the Rules of Civil Procedure. The opinion specifically addressed that policy
in the context of a motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim:
The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed
liberally to promote justice. Consistent with this liberal approach,
a circuit court may look beyond the technical nomenclature of the
complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to reach the
substance of the parties' positions. This approach is particularly
proper where the plaintiff attempts orally to explain the allegations
226 473 S.E.2d 910 (W. Va. 1996).
227 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
228 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996).
Special]
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of the complaint because such explanations may constitute an
admission against the plaintiff.229
The Harrison opinion went a step further. It created a procedure for a
plaintiff to use in an effort to avoid a motion to dismiss:
Where a plaintiff opposes a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and claims that
discovery would enable him or her to oppose such a motion, the
plaintiff may request a continuance for further discovery pursuant
to Rule 56(f) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. In
order to obtain such a discovery continuance, a plaintiff must, at a
minimum, (1) articulate some plausible basis for the plaintiff's
belief that specified "discoverable" material facts likely exist
which have not yet become accessible to the plaintiff; (2)
demonstrate some realistic prospect that the material facts can be
obtained within a reasonable additional time period; (3)
demonstrate that the material facts will, if obtained, suffice to
engender an issue both genuine and material; and (4) demonstrate
good cause for failure to have conducted the discovery earlier."
J. Dismissal for Failing to Prosecute
The case of Dimon v. Mansy' examined dismissal of an action for failure
to prosecute:
Before a court may dismiss an action under Rule 41(b), notice and
an opportunity to be heard must be given to all parties of record.
To the extent that Brent v. Board of Trustees of Davis & Elkins
College, 173 W. Va. 36, 311 S.E.2d 153 (1983), and any of our
previous holdings differ with this ruling, they are expressly
overruled. 2
229 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
230 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
231 479 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1996).
232 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
[Vol. I00:
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The opinion then set out a detailed procedure for trial courts to follow in
determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute:
In carrying out the notice and opportunity to be heard
requirements, before a case may be dismissed under Rule 41(b),
the following guidelines should be followed: First when a circuit
court is contemplating dismissing an action under Rule 41(b), the
court must first send a notice of its intent to do so to all counsel of
record and to any parties who have appeared and do not have
counsel of record. The notice shall inform that unless the plaintiff
shall file and duly serve a motion within fifteen days of the date of
the notice, alleging good cause why the action should not be
dismissed, then such action will be dismissed, and that such action
also will be dismissed unless plaintiff shall request such motion be
heard or request a determination without a hearing. Second, any
party opposing such motion shall serve upon the court and the
opposing counsel a response to such motion within fifteen days of
the service of such motion, or appear and resist such motion if it be
sooner set for hearing. Third, if no motion is made opposing
dismissal, or if a motion is made and is not set for hearing by either
party, the court may decide the issue upon the existing record after
expiration of the time for serving a motion and any reply. If the
motion is made, the court shall decide the motion promptly after
the hearing. Fourth, the plaintiff bears the burden of going forward
with evidence as to good cause for not dismissing the action; if the
plaintiff does come forward with good cause, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to show substantial prejudice to it in allowing the
case to proceed; if the defendant does show substantial prejudice,
then the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to establish that
the proffered good cause outweighs the prejudice to the defendant.
Fifth, the court, in weighing the evidence of good cause and
substantial prejudice, should also consider (1) the actual amount of
time involved in the dormancy of the case, (2) whether the plaintiff
made any inquiries to his or her counsel about the status of the case
during the period of dormancy, and (3) other relevant factors
bearing on good cause and substantial prejudice. Sixth, if a motion
opposing dismissal has been served, the court shall make written
findings, and issue a written order which, if adverse to the plaintiff,
shall be appealable to this Court as a final order; if the order is
adverse to the defendant, an appeal on the matter may only be
taken in conjunction with the final judgment order terminating the
Special]
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case from the docket. If no motion opposing dismissal has been
served, the order need only state the ground for dismissal under
Rule 41(b). Seventh, if the plaintiff does not prosecute an appeal
of an adverse decision to this Court within the period of time
provided by our rules and statutes, the plaintiff may proceed under
Rule 41(b)'s three-term rule to seek reinstatement of the case by
the circuit court - with the time running from the date the circuit
court issued its adverse order. Eighth, should a plaintiff seek
reinstatement under Rule 41 (b), the burden of going forward with
the evidence and the burden of persuasion shall be the same as if
the plaintiff had responded to the court's initial notice, and a ruling
on reinstatement shall be appealable as previously provided by our
rule.23
K Sanctions
The case of Bartles v. Hinkle" permitted Justice Cleckley to fully address
sanctions:
Although Rules 11, 16, and 37 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure do not formally require any particular procedure, before
issuing a sanction, a court must ensure it has an adequate
foundation either pursuant to the rules or by virtue of its inherent
powers to exercise its authority. The Due Process Clause of
Section 10 of Article Ill of the West Virginia Constitution requires
that there exist a relationship between the sanctioned party's
misconduct and the matters in controversy such that the
transgression threatens to interfere with the rightful decision of the
case. Thus, a court must ensure any sanction imposed is fashioned
to address the identified harm caused by the party's misconduct.235
Justice Cleckley then fashioned guidelines for trial courts to follow in
considering sanctions:
In formulating the appropriate sanction, a court shall be guided by
233 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
234 472 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1996).
235 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
[Vol. 100:
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equitable principles. Initially, the court must identify the alleged
wrongful conduct and determine if it warrants a sanction. The
court must explain its reasons clearly on the record if it decides a
sanction is appropriate. To determine what will constitute an
appropriate sanction, the court may consider the seriousness of the
conduct, the impact the conduct had in the case and in the
administration of justice, any mitigating circumstances, and
whether the conduct was an isolated occurrence or was a pattern of
wrongdoing throughout the case.2 6
VI. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. Domestic Violence
In a forceful and committed tone, Justice Cleckley wrote in the case of In
re Browning 7 that "[d]omestic violence cases are among those that our courts must
give priority status. In W. Va. Code, 48-2A-1, et seq., the West Virginia Legislature
took steps to ensure that these cases are handled both effectively and efficiently by
law enforcement agencies and the judicial system. ' The Browning opinion set out
guidelines for courts to follow in issuing domestic violence protective orders, when
a court may be disqualified from addressing the matter:
Magistrates are statutorily required to provide an individual with
any assistance necessary to complete a petition for a protective
order. Once the petition is completed, the magistrate must file the
petition and, upon a showing of sufficient facts, issue a protective
order. If a magistrate believes that she or he is disqualified from
handling the matter, the magistrate must examine carefully whether
the rule of necessity applies. Under no circumstances should a
victim of abuse be turned away from a magistrate or a circuit judge
without ensuring the victim will receive prompt attention by
another magistrate or judge. 9
236 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
237 452 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1994).
238 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
239 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
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